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Abstract: We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not 
require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash equilibrium. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  idea  of  speculation  as  trading  based  on  information  differences  is  a 
widespread one both inside and outside of economics. Such phenomenon as betting on 
horse races, not to speak of speculation in the stock market, are difficult to imagine in a 
world in which everyone has identical beliefs. Indeed, authors such as Hirshleifer [1975] 
have argued that the very idea of speculation is meaningless unless there are differences 
in beliefs. Yet the idea of speculation as information based trading runs quickly afoul of 
various no-trade theorems.  The simplest such result is that if agents are risk averse and 
have  a  common  prior,  and  the  initial  allocation  is  Pareto-optimal,  then  in  a  Nash 
equilibrium  there  must  be  no  trade.  This  follows  from  the  fact  that  if  there  were  an 
equilibrium  with  trade,  each  agent  would  at  least  weakly  improve  his  utility, 
contradicting the assumption that the initial allocation was optimal.  Kreps [1977] and 
Tirole [1982] prove extensions of this result to rational expectations equilibria with risk-
neutral  traders.  Milgrom  and  Stokey  [1982]  show  that  the  assumption  of  Nash 
equilibrium can be replaced by the assumption that it is common knowledge that all 
players  have  prefer  the  proposed  allocation  to  the  initial  one.  Thus,  either  Nash 
equilibrium or common knowledge of agreement to trade, along with a common prior and 
risk averse agents, implies that there cannot be trade solely on the basis of differences in 
beliefs. 
  From  the  viewpoint  of  non-equilibrium  learning  theory,  though,  both  the 
assumption  of  a  common  prior  on  Nature’s  moves  and  the  assumption  of  a  Nash 
equilibrium (that is, a common belief on players’ strategies) may be too strong. In the 
theory  of  learning  in  games,  the  assumption  of  exogenous  knowledge  about  the 
distribution of moves is replaced with the idea that players acquire knowledge through 
learning.  Thus common beliefs about either Nature’s moves or the play of other players 
may or may not arise, depending on the environment. Consequently, the steady states of 
standard learning processes correspond not to the Nash equilibria but to the larger class of 
self-confirming  equilibria  that  we  introduced  in  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1993].
3  In 
simultaneous-move  complete-information  games,  if  players  observe  the  profiles  of 
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actions played in each round, the self-confirming equilibria coincide with the set of Nash 
equilibria  of  the  game.
4    By  contrast,  as  argued  in  Dekel  et  al  [2004],  in  games  of 
incomplete information, if players begin with inconsistent priors there are broad classes 
of games in which the self-confirming equilibria (and  hence the steady states of standard 
learning processes)  do not coincide with the Nash equilibria. 
  Nevertheless, there are important classes of incomplete-information games  where 
the steady states of learning models do coincide with the Nash equilibria.  For example, 
Dekel at al showed that this is the case when players observe one another’s actions and 
there are independent private values.  In the trading games that we consider here, it is not 
plausible that all agents observe one another’s actions. Never-the-less the equivalence of 
Nash and self-confirming equilibria still holds, because the games have the property that 
each agent knows his own utility function and hence knows the payoff he will get from 
not trading. As we show, it is this “known security level” property that underlies the no-
trade results.  
In addition, we show that not even self-confirming equilibrium is needed for the 
no-trade conclusion.  Specifically, while the steady states of standard learning processes 
must  be  self-confirming  equilibrium,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  even  well-behaved 
learning  procedures  necessarily  converge  to  a  steady  state.  For  this  reason,  we  also 
examine the notion of “marginal best response distributions” introduced by Fudenberg 
and Levine [1995]. If all players follow learning procedures that are moderately rational, 
then the joint distribution of play must at least converge to the set of these distributions. 
In both  cases,  we show that the no-trade theorem applies. The intuition is simple: if 
agents are risk averse, the only possibility of trade is based on information differences, 
and trade takes place, then there must be an agent who would do better not to trade. A 
player need not be a terribly clever learner to discover that he is doing poorly, all that is 
required is that he know the utility he would get by not trading. So in the long run, all 
trade must stop. 
                                                 
4 We will not formally model the dynamics of learning, but we have in mind “belief-based” processes in 
which players base their actions on their beliefs about opponents’ play. Fudenberg and Kreps [1995] and 
Fudenberg and Levine [1993b] showed that the long-run outcomes of such processes correspond to the self-
confirming  equilibria;  they  considered  general  extensive  form  games  and  supposed  that  the  signals 
corresponded to the terminal nodes of the game.   3 
  We should emphasize that we are not claiming that in practice there is no trade 
based on information differences. Rather we are claiming that there must be some other 
underlying reason for trade, such as portfolio balance, joy of betting on the horses, noise 
traders who are not rational, before it becomes possible to trade based on information 
differences. See for example, Zurita (2004) for a model in which underlying gains to 
balancing portfolios allows trading based on information differences in  a model with 
common knowledge. 
2.  The Model 
  There are  ￿  traders  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Each trader has finitely many possible types, 
with trader  i ’s type denoted  ￿ ￿ .  The profile of types ￿  is called the state.  There are  m 
goods,  so  the  consumption  bundle  consumed  by  trader  i   is  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .    Trader  i ’s 
endowment is  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  depending his type; note that endowments do not depend on the 
types of other players.
5 Utility  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is Von Neumann-Morgenstern and comes from 
the consumption of goods and may  also depend on the state.  We assume strict risk 
aversion: 
Assumption 1:  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is strictly concave. 
  The final allocation is determined from endowments by a finite simultaneous-
move game.
6  Each trader i observes his own type  ￿ ￿  then chooses an action  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
from a finite set.  Mixed actions are denoted by  ￿ ￿ .  The final allocation is given by 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and is assumed to be socially feasible 
Assumption 2:  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Each trader has the option of not trading, denoted by  ￿
￿ ￿ . 
Assumption 3:  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  If learning by traders is to be possibly, the economy must meet repeatedly.  We 
assume that each time the economy meets the state is determined by an independent draw 
                                                 
5 Since a player’s type is supposed to encapsulate all private information available to him, and since we 
presume  players  know  their  own  endowments  before  beginning  trading,  a  player’s  own  type  should 
determine his endowment. 
6 Or the game may be an elaborate dynamic game, in which case our simultaneous move game represents 
the strategic form.   4 
from  a  fixed  (objective)  probability  distribution  ￿  that  is  unknown  to  the  traders.  
Traders do not necessarily observe the realized value of  ￿ , so if they start out with 
incorrect beliefs about ￿, it is not obvious that they will learn the true distribution. 
  Since we are interested only in trade due to differences in beliefs, we must rule 
out other reasons for trade.  Consequently we assume that the endowment is ex ante 
Pareto efficient; that is  
Assumption 4: There exist weights  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that if  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
We  consider  two  equilibrium  concepts  that  relax  Nash  equilibrium.  The  key 
components of self-confirming (and Nash) equilibrium are each player i’s beliefs about 
Nature’s  move,  her  strategy,  and  her  conjecture  about  the  strategies  used  by  her 
opponents.  Player  ￿’s  beliefs,  denoted  by  ￿￿ ￿ ,  are  a  point  in  the  space  ￿￿ ￿￿   of 
distributions over Nature’s move, and her strategy is a map  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  The space 
of all such strategies is denoted  Si , and the player’s conjectures about opponents’ play 
are  assumed  to  be  a  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,  that  is,  a  strategy  profile  of  i’s  opponents.    The 
notation  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  refers to the conditional distribution derived from  ￿￿ ￿ , conditional on 
the private type  ￿ ￿ , while  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denotes the probability that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  assigns to ai .   
Of course, what players might learn from repeated play depends on what they 
observe at the end of each round of play. To model this, the equilibrium concepts suppose 
that after each play of the game, players receive private signals  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  As the 
notation indicates, these signals are a deterministic function of ￿ and ￿ .  We assume that 
each player observes her own private signal  ￿ ￿ , along with her own action and own type, 
so  these  are  their  only  sources  of  information  about  Nature’s  and  their  opponents’ 
moves.
7   
Our equilibrium concept is a variation on the type of self -confirming equilibrium 
defined in Fudenberg and Levine [1993] and Dekel el al [2004] 
                                                 
7 We consider the case in which knowledge of opponents’ play comes only from learning by observation 
and updating, and not from deduction based on opponents’ rationality, so we do not require that players 
know their opponents’ utility functions or beliefs.  Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994), Battigalli and Guaitoli 
(1997) and Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (1999) present solution concepts based on steady states in which 
players do make deductions based on rationality of the other players.     5 
Definition 1:  A strategy profile s  is an ￿-self-confirming equilibrium with conjectures 
￿ ￿ ￿￿  and beliefs  ￿￿ ￿  if for each player ￿, 
(i)  for all  ￿ ￿  , ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
and for any pair   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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and for any  ￿ ￿  in the range of  ￿ ￿  
(iii) 
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We say that  ￿  is a self-confirming equilibrium if there is some collection  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  
such that (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied.
8 
  Our key assumption is that each trader observes enough information to determine 
her  utility  from  the  no-trade  action.  For  example.  if  the  endowment  represents  some 
complicated stock portfolio, and the trader engages in a complicated series of trades, if 
the trader does not observe the prices of stocks that were held in positive quantities in her 
endowment, but were traded away, then she may not be able to determine the utility of 
not having traded at all.  
Assumption 5: (Known Security Levels): 
  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  depends only on  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .
9  
                                                 
8 It is appropriate to have a single  ￿ ￿ ￿￿  for each player i in the definition because we assume that there is a 
single agent in each player role.  This is called the “unitary” version of self-confirming equilibria; when we 
consider large populations and matching in Section 4 we allow for heterogeneous beliefs.   
Note that i’s beliefs about opponents’ play take the form of a strategy profile as opposed to a 
probability  distribution  over  strategy  profiles.    The  complications  that  arise  due  to  correlations  in 
conjectures are discussed in Fudenberg and Kreps (1988) and Fudenberg and Levine (1993a); we simplify 
by ignoring them here.  Given this restriction, there is no further loss of generality in taking beliefs to be 
point conjectures.  Battigalli (1987) defined a similar concept to the one above, as did Kalai and Lehrer 
(1993). 
9 That is, if for some ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   6 
This  immediately  implies  the  following  sufficient  condition  for  an  ￿-self-confirming 
equilibrium, which underlies our first result: 
Lemma  1:  If  a  profile  of  mixed  actions  ￿  is  a  ￿-self-confirming  equilibrium,  then   
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  implies 
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
 
This says that the expected utility from the action actually taken gives within  e of the 
utility from the endowment.   
  The idea of self-confirming equilibrium is that we do not require that players 
beliefs about what they did not see opponents do be correct.  However, there is no general 
theorem guaranteeing the global convergence of a sensible class of learning procedures to 
a self-confirming equilibrium.  This leads us our second “equilibrium” notion, a variation 
the idea of a marginal best response distribution introduced in Fudenberg and Levine 
[1995].   
Definition 2: A joint distribution  ￿ over pure action profiles is an  ￿-marginal best 
response distribution if  
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
where  ￿ ￿￿  is the marginal over all actions by players other than player ￿. 
  This says that the utility that player ￿ actually gets is at least within ￿ of the most 
he could get against the marginal distribution of opponents actions; that is, correlations 
are  ignored.    The  significance  of  this  notion  is  that  there  exist  a  broad  class  of 
approximately universally consistent learning strategies and if players use such strategies, 
asymptotic play will be close to an approximate marginal best response distribution even 
if it never converges.  From the definition, it appears that it is necessary that players 
observe their opponents actions. However, Fudenberg and Levine [1998] and Hart and 
Mas-Colell [2001] show that there are learning  procedures that  give this result when 
players observe only their own action and own utility. In particular, Assumption 5 need 
not be satisfied for these learning procedures to work.  In other words,  marginal best   7 
response  distributions  capture  long-run  non-equilibrium  play  under  the  very  weak 
assumption that players know their past actions and payoffs. 
3.  The Result 
  Our  conclusion  is  that  in  the  limit  as  ￿ ￿ ￿   for  either  self-confirming  or 
marginal  best-response  there  is  convergence  to  no-trade.    The  idea  is  that  under  our 
assumption of strict concavity of the utility functions, any probability distribution over 
socially feasible allocations that Pareto dominates the endowment must involve no-trade.  
As  e ® 0 both  e-self confirming equilibria and  e-marginal best response distributions 
give each trader at least the utility that they could get from their endowment, and so the 
limiting allocation must weakly Pareto dominate the endowment. 
  First we show that socially feasible allocations that weakly Pareto dominate the 
endowment involve no trade. 
Lemma 2:  If ￿ is a joint probability distribution over actions such that 
  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
then  
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Proof:  Since  ￿  is ex ante Pareto efficient, and the  ￿ ￿ ’s are strictly concave the only 
socially feasible allocation that weakly Pareto dominates  ￿  is  ￿  itself.  Consequently, 
any  probability  distribution  over  socially  feasible  allocations  that  weakly  Pareto 
dominates ￿  must choose ￿  with probability one.  The result now follows from the fact 
that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is socially feasible. 
￿ 
  Our main results now say that in the limit both self-confirming equilibria and 
marginal best response equilibria involve no trade.  In the case of self-confirming, the 
fact that each trader gets at least the endowment utility in the limit follows from upper 
hemi-continuity of the  ￿-equilibrium correspondence and the fact that trader know the 
endowment utility. 
Theorem 1:  If   ￿ ￿  is are a sequence of ￿-self-confirming equilibrium then  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,   8 
where  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is the joint probability distribution over actions induced by  ￿ ￿ . 
Proof:  If not there is an action ￿ , a state ￿  and a subsequence such that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .    Since    ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  it  follows  from 
continuity and the Lemma 1 that 
 
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
This contradicts Lemma 2. 
￿ 
  In the case of  ￿-marginal best response distribution the fact that each trader gets 
at least the endowment utility in the limit follows from the fact that a marginal best 
response distribution gives each player at least the minmax. 
Theorem 2: If  ￿ ￿  is are a sequence of ￿-marginal best response distributions then  
  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Proof:  As in the proof of Theorem 1, we may use the definition of an e-marginal best 
response distribution to conclude that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  with 
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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this again contradicts Lemma 2. 
￿   9 
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